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A B S T R A C T
Smart Grid (SG) systems are critical, intelligent infrastructure utility services connected through
open networks that are potentially susceptible to cyber-attacks with very acute security risks
of shutdown, loss of life, and loss of revenue.Traditional intrusion detection systems based
on signature and anomaly techniques are no longer sufficient to protect SGs due to their
new connectivity and management challenges, the ever-rapidly-evolving masquerades, and
cyber criminality levied against them. SGs require cyber-security systems to render them
resilient and protected through advanced Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS)
techniques and mechanisms. This paper proposes a smart collaborative advanced IDPS to
provide the best possible protection of SGs with a fully distributed management structure
that supports the network and host based detections and the prevention of attacks. By fa-
cilitating a reliable, scalable, and flexible design, the specific requirements of IDPS for SGs
can be more easily met via a fuzzy risk analyzer, an independent and ontology knowledge-
based inference engine module.These can work collaboratively by managing functions across
multiple IDPS domains. A set of extensive and intensive simulated experiments shows that
with its smart advanced components incorporating soft computing machine-learning tech-
niques and a rich ontology knowledge base with fuzzy logic analysis, it detects and prevents
intrusions more efficiently. The multi-faceted results of the simulation also show that the
proposed Collaborative Smart IDPS (CSIDPS) system increases the intrusion detection ac-
curacy and decreases the false positive alarms when compared to traditional IDPSs. This
is epitomized by the skillful use of the confusion matrix technique for organizing classifi-
ers, visualizing their performance, and assessing their overall behavior. In the final analysis,
the CSIDPS architecture is designed toward contributing to de facto norms for SG ecosystems.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The traditional electrical grid includes three primary electri-
cal networks: generation, transmission, and distribution. SG
extends these networks by using advanced Information Com-
munication Technologies (ICT) comprising of both wired and
wireless networks, including the power to create ad hoc net-
works in the case of emergencies.Through this extension, the
Home Area Network (HAN) is also covered (Fabro et al., 2010).
This makes SG a vast network that operates simultaneously
on both supply (production) and demand (consumption) sides.
This distinction is important as there is a narrow observability
into the network of the demand-side prior to the SG. Tradi-
tional Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
networks lack such integration and remain logically and physi-
cally separate.
SG is the fusion of the SCADA networks and ICT, which en-
hances the delivery of electricity to consumers with minimum
disruption by providing a self-managing system for increased
efficiency, revenue generation, and resilience to replace aging
critical infrastructures (Stouffer et al., 2011).
Future SGs will introduce new functionality to the current
electrical power systems with objectives of high resistance to
disturbances, full control of electrical supply and consump-
tion in distribution networks, and network observability
enhancement using advanced management functions. Func-
tionality might also include dynamic pricing and/or the
communication of price signals for flexibility. This introduces
new security risks, addressed through answering the follow-
ing two questions:
1.1. Why does SG need protection?
Our dependency on electricity and reliance on the SG for elec-
tricity management and distributionmake it a critical asset in
our life. Disruption of the electrical power supply has immense
societal consequences and impacts.To name a few, it can para-
lyze the functioning of governments, telecommunication
systems, financial services and health care environments. SG
is an extremely critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is crucial
to focus primarily on the safety and security of the SG.
The backbone of the SG is its underlying networks that
connect different components together and allowmutual com-
munication between them.This makes them readily exposed
to cyber-attacks. The HAN within the demand-side provides
the easiest point of access for cyber attackers. The connectiv-
ity of networks between SCADA and ICT also increases the
cyber-attack risk, which is becoming a grave concern ranging
from hacking and terrorist attacks to industrial espionage
(Rosenfield, 2010).
System vulnerabilities also allow an attacker to hack the
control management center’s functions and manipulate the
distribution of the electricity load conditions in order to damage
equipment, destabilize an SG, or block network access (Ericsson,
2010). Most of the systems require real-time data and any
latency or loss may have adverse effects on the electrical power
grids.
In most cyber-attack scenarios, the attacker manipulates all
well-known vulnerabilities and misconfigured servers, oper-
ating systems, and network devices (Sgouras et al., 2014).
According to the Dell annual threat report, the number of
attacks against SCADA systems is on the rise and tends to be
political in nature as they target operational capabilities within
power plants, factories and refineries (Dell, 2015). Cyber inci-
dents like these necessitate intrinsically embedding cyber
security systems with sophisticated IDPSs as a fundamental
requirement of future SGs to overcome deliberate vandalism
and unintentional/accidental damage (Hawk and Kaushiva,
2014).
1.2. Why are Traditional Security Systems not sufficient?
SG security exhibits novel challenges for industry and re-
searchers, beyond the traditional safety issues of SCADA and
ICT networks because of the following:
• Over the last few years there have been a growing number
of serious cyber security incidents attacking SG-based criti-
cal infrastructures.
• The accessibility of the SG-based interconnection of systems
and their management via the internet both wired and
wirelessly spectacularly increase the chances for target-
ing and penetrating them by cyber attackers.
• SGs do not necessarily obey new critical infrastructure regu-
lations to the letter, thus making them open to attacks at
various levels of operations.
• SG inevitably contains legacy systems that cannot be
updated, patched, or protected by traditional ICT security
techniques, and the legacy systems and devices with limited
computing resources have inadequate security in them,
leaving them open for attacks.
• SGs consist of a multitude of heterogeneous network tech-
nologies and protocols (such as TCP/IP, ProfiBus, ModBus,
and DNP), each with different levels or no level of security.
• SG networks are massive and can potentially climb to bil-
lions of network nodes, which can cause enormous security
alarms and event correlation handling problems due to per-
formance and scalability constraints.
• SGs need to be resistant to all kinds of distributed denial
of service (DoS) attacks when hackers deliberately orches-
trate thousands of compromised computers to overwhelm
a website or server with traffic. Hence, SGs must be resil-
ient to such attacks, with both a pre-active and post-
active updating mechanism.
• SGs will need to ensure that wired and wireless carriers offer
appropriate Service Level Agreement (SLA) which is differ-
ent from those provided to their consumer customers that
guarantee an appropriate level of network performance even
under adverse conditions, such as environmental factors or
security incidents resulting in government mandates lim-
iting commercial traffic in the event of a terrorist attack.
• Future SGs should accommodate new requirements of being
fully automated autonomic interconnected systems over a
varied set of data communication protocols, capable of au-
tomatic load balancing, delay avoidance, bandwidth reuse
and slicing, and maximizing throughput dynamically. All of
these requirements have inherent security risk of one kind
or another, which traditional security systems and ser-
vices are deemed inadequate.
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One of the best ways to protect an SG is to provide a Smart
IDPS (SIDPS), where it performs early detection of malicious
activity and prevents more severe damage to the protected
systems in real-time. By using SIDPS, one can potentially iden-
tify an attack, either by taking immediate action or by
preventing it from succeeding, so that the threat can be avoided.
Moreover, there are two techniques of detection that can be
utilized by IDPS:
1. Misuse detection uses known patterns called signatures of
unauthorized behavior to predict and detect subsequent
similar attempts.
2. Anomaly detection is designed to uncover abnormal pat-
terns of behavior.The IDPS establishes a baseline of normal
usage patterns, and anything that widely deviates from this
is flagged as a possible intrusion.
Misuse techniques are inefficient in detecting unknown
attacks; anomaly techniques can detect most attacks but suffer
from unmanageable false positive alarms (Perdisci et al., 2006).
False positive errors occur when an IDPS incorrectly identi-
fies benign activity as being malicious, whereas false negative
errors occur when it fails to identify malicious activity. Despite
all its benefits, current IDPSs have not reached the level of ma-
turity to provide fully-fledged protection.
Due to the stated importance and critical nature of SG pro-
tection as an infrastructure utility service and the inefficiency
of traditional IDPSs, this research develops an SIDPS compris-
ing of autonomic, Ontology Knowledge Base (OKB), inference
engine, and fuzzy logic risk manager advanced components
surpassing traditional IDPS functionality to provide robust de-
tection, prevention, and overcome challenges and constraints
of future SG. In order to achieve this, the system’s require-
ments are identified, and the system’s functionality with SIDPS
components is designed to accommodate collaborative man-
agement structures.A SCADA network is selected for evaluating
our proposed SIDPS with a set of advanced components.
2. Related works
The capabilities of IDPSs are well known (Patel et al., 2013;
Hung-Jen et al., 2013), but mostly ignored for SG since limited
scholarly work has been conducted.There appears to be no sig-
nificant research that investigates IDPS for SG, including all
aspects of the system’s architecture, functionality, speed, de-
tection, accuracy, and performance.
Typically, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are used on
the supply side in traditional SCADA networks. However, these
traditional networks do not meet the criteria required for new
advanced systems and network requirements, which face an
ever-growing barrage of cyber-attacks. Even the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) framework for a
Smart Grid lacks the necessary, advanced components to fend
off hybrid invasions. To date, the framework does not include
a machine learning technique that would detect new mali-
cious attacks or packets (NIST, 2014). On the customer side, there
are hardly any IDSs for Advanced Metering Infrastructures
(AMIs) to overcome falsification of readings (Faisal et al., 2012).
Valdes and Cheung developed an IDS on the supply-side
using statistical anomaly and signature detection techniques
deployed in both the network and host (Valdes and Cheung,
2009). It was not adaptive because they built a fixed topology
model based only on network traffic. Recently, Carcano et al.
proposed an IDS based on the concepts of Critical State Analy-
sis for SG, but they only investigated the detection and not the
prevention methods (Carcano et al., 2011).
For the demand-side, Faisal et al. proposed an anomaly-
based IDS module using data mining techniques for three local
AMI components: smart meters, data concentrators, and the
central system.Themain drawbacks were: (1) it required a great
deal of memory in order to operate smart meters; (2) it could
not handle dynamic network traffic changes; (3) finally, no so-
lution was included for coordinating the activities of the various
IDSs (Faisal et al., 2012).
Wu et al. proposed an NIDPS for HAN to protect the devices
connected to a home energy management system employing
both signature and anomaly detection (Wu et al., 2011). Its scope
is narrow and deficient, and it cannot detect a broad range of
cyber-attack scenarios in SG networks.
Yu et al. combined the anomaly detection mechanism with
a watermarking scheme in an attempt to prevent more stealthy
attacks that involve subtle manipulation of the measure-
ment data in SG networks. The findings show the proposed
integrated mechanism can accurately detect strong attacks (Yu
et al., 2015).
Kush et al. noted that the robustness and seamless inte-
gration of IDPS is a serious challenge for future SGs, and none
of the researchers have addressed this problem successfully
(Kush et al., 2011). Due to this deficiency, we propose an inte-
grated collaborative SIDPS architectural system by first
identifying the essential system’s requirements that follow.
3. Collaborative Smart Grid IDPS (CSIDPS)
requirements
As a precursor to understanding the nature and concerns of
collaborative Smart Grid IDPS requirements, we define them
here, and which are referred to throughout the paper at criti-
cal points of discussion.
Stand-alone IDPS has a number of desirable characteris-
tics for optimized performance, maximum protection and
minimum error that easily translates into a set of non-
functional system requirements as portrayed from a purely
software engineering perspective (Sharma and Sinha, 2011). It
lacks the advanced functionality to meet the real-time nature
and dynamics of applications, systems and networks for current
SGs as a set of critical infrastructures.
Kush et al. (2011) identified seven functional require-
ments for an IDPS by examining certain SG characteristics, but
these requirements are limited and lacking desirable IDPS func-
tions like collaborative and prevention attributes such as:
• Run continuously without human supervision/intervention
• Be survivable and fault tolerant
• Be simply tailored to a particular set of the network
• Adapt to changes in the system’s behavior over time
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• Recognize all or most intrusions in real-time with a
minimum number of false-positive alarms
• Be autonomic self-monitoring and self-protecting against
attacker modification
• Be autonomic self-configurable according to the
changing security policies and dynamics of the network
topologies
Scaling such an IDPS to a set of useful and advanced col-
laborative SIDPSs involves additional general/high-level
requirements beyond what is stated in Table 1 that cross mul-
tiple internet working domains as follows:
• FR1: Demand Response and Consumer Energy Efficiency: Mecha-
nisms for utilities, business, industrial, and residential
customers to cut their energy use during peak demand times
or power reliability is at very high risk. Demand response
is required for optimizing the balance between power supply
and demand.With increased access to detailed energy con-
sumption information, consumers can also save energy with
efficiency, behavior, and investments that achieve measur-
able results.
• FR2: Wide-area Situational Awareness: Monitoring real-time
traffic and power-system performance of interconnected
components over vast geographic areas. The goals of
situational awareness are to understand and ultimately
optimize the management of power network compo-
nents, behavior, and performance, as well as to anticipate,
prevent or respond to problems before any disruptions
occur.
• FR3: Energy Storage: Means of storing energy, directly or in-
directly.The most common bulk energy storage technology
used today is pumped hydroelectric storage technology.
However, new storage technologies and capabilities – es-
pecially for big data distributed storage – would benefit the
entire Smart Grid, from generation to end-user usage pro-
vided they are protected from cyber breaches and attacks.
• FR4: Electric Transportation: It is primarily to enable large-
scale integration of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs).
• FR5: Network Communications: Accommodating a variety of
public and private communications networks used for SG.
Given this variety of networking environments, the iden-
tification of performance metrics and core operational
requirements of different applications, processors, and
domains is critical to the SG.
• FR6: Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI): Provides real-
time monitoring of power usage and assessing the status
of utilities.These advanced metering networks are of many
different designs and easily used to implement residen-
tial demand response including dynamic pricing.
• FR7: Distribution Grid Management: Focuses on maximizing
performance of feeders, transformers, and other compo-
nents of networked distribution systems and integrating
them with transmission systems and customer operations.
• FR8 Cyber-Security: Encompasses measures to ensure the con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability of the electronic
information communication systems and the control
systems necessary for the management, operation, and
protection of the SG’s computer, telecommunications
infrastructures, and energy.
Table 1 – Collaborative SIDPS general requirements for SG
No. Requirement Purpose
GR1 Support for legacy protocols
and systems
With new emerging modern communication protocols and systems, SG still is largely
dependent on legacy communication protocols and nodal systems composed of legacy
hardware with limited computing resources, long maintenance cycles, and their stand-alone
distributed placement. The IDPS should handle these systems and protocols without any
degradation or effect on real-time performance.
GR2 Scalability Due to the extensive coverage of users in SG, an IDPS should be scalable to deal with the vast
number of network communication nodes.
GR3 High accuracy of detection and
prevention capability with least
false alarms generation
Due to the growth of attacks, complexity and unpredictability, it is necessary for the system to
recognize any new attacks and their vulnerable intention to choose the best response
according to the risk severity and proper prevention strategy without human intervention.
The system should have the ability of declaring the least number of false alarms and should
be able to self-learn and improve its detection capability over a period.
GR4 Standards compliance The IDPS should accommodate established international ICT and SCADA standards as well as
emerging SG standards.
GR5 Adaptive The architectural model of IDPSs should be able to handle any changes to the topology of the
SG and allow the monitoring and control of network elements in real-time.
GR6 Accuracy Due to the critical mission of an SG, IDPS should not adversely affect the performance of the
real-time processes and the underlying network, especially when network traffic changes.
IDPS should be deterministic in its behavior.
GR7 Synchronization of
autonomous IDPSs
A collaborative IDPS is effectively a massive collaboration of a large number of autonomous
IDPSs.While each IDPS operates independently, their information and activities synchronized
in order to recognize distributed and concurrent attacks, apply an appropriate response or
modify a particular component system or the whole network configuration, and adopt proper
prevention strategies through collaboration.
GR8 Resistance to compromise A SIDPS must protect itself from unauthorized access or attacks. It should be capable of
authenticating networked devices and other IDPSs mutually, authenticating the administrator
and auditing his/her actions, protecting its data and blocking any loopholes that may create
additional vulnerabilities.
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These functional requirements of Smart Grid structures, in-
frastructures, and networks are drawn into any SG falling within
its purview or definition. IDPSs are endeavoring to fulfill the
cyber-security technical requirements pertaining to FR8 as a
set of safety measures. With the increased complexities and
huge traffic flows of systems and networks, more innovative
functional requirements of SG make it a challenge for FR8, not
only to detect network intrusions in comparison with other
traditional networks, but to sophisticatedly use advanced com-
putational techniques from the subject areas of soft computing,
machine learning, data mining optimization, predictive ana-
lytics and ontology. FR1, FR3, and FR4 have made the SG
networks very sensitive and they emboss the role of FR8 as a
whole to maintain the uptime of the SG network. FR2 and
FR7 present a distributed model of the network. Distributed
computing has always been a challenge for intrusion detec-
tion systems. These networks are not centralized; therefore,
IDS should be designed to operate in a distributed fashion.The
main problem of the FR8 is monitoring all the data traffic over
the network. FR6 is one of the smart components of an SG. Logi-
cally, the intrusion may target the AMI of the SG and if a
functional requirement is targeted to be compromised or hit,
then, the whole network can be damaged to the extent that
it becomes temporarily degraded or non-operative (physi-
cally down) until a restart.
4. Collaborative SIDPS (CSIDPS) for an SG
Given the requirements in Table 1, Collaborative SIDPS (CSIDPS),
in terms of a system’s structure and functionality with the
support of distributed management fixed and mobile agents,
which cooperate with diverse SIDPS actions instantaneously,
is proposed. It provides a robust and seamless integrated pro-
tection within the supply and demand sides of an SG to
overcome large-scale attacks and to use the computational re-
sources efficiently.
4.1. System’s structure
There are two types of a typical IDPS structure: individual or
collaborative.Typically, an individual IDPS is achieved by physi-
cally integrating it within the firewall.These IDPSs are ineffective
at protecting critical infrastructure assets because they produce
more irrelevant and false alarms. A collaborative IDPS con-
sists of multiple IDPSs over a vast network where they
intercommunicate and are more efficient to detect and prevent
intrusions, such as Contrabot against botnets (Stevanovic et al.,
2012). These IDPSs have two main functional components: (i)
the detection element and (ii) the correlation handler. Detec-
tion elements monitor their sub-network or host individually
and generate low-level alerts. The correlation handler trans-
forms these alerts into high-level event reports. A collaborative
IDPS has three structural forms:
1. Centralized: Each IDPS acts as a detection element where
it produces warnings locally. The generated alerts are sent
to a central management control server that plays the role
of a correlation handler to analyze them and make an ac-
curate detection decision. The main drawback is that the
central unit is extremely vulnerable, and any failure can lead
to deactivating the whole correlation function.
2. Hierarchical: The entire system is divided into several small
groups/domains. The IDPSs at the lowest level work as de-
tection elements, while the IDPSs at higher levels are
furnished with both a detection element and a correlation
handler acting as aggregators.The IDPSs in the higher level
correlate alerts from both their level and lower levels. The
correlated alerts are passed to a higher level for further
analysis, an aggregation decision.This is more scalable than
the centralized approach but still suffers from the short-
comings of any function employed using the centralized
approach which can partly paralyze/stop the whole sys-
tem’s operation.
3. Fully distributed: The coordinator function is distributed to
process the information autonomously with passive inter-
action between interconnected nodes. It compromises fully
autonomous systems with distributed management control.
All participating IDPSs have their detection elements and
a correlation handler acting as an aggregator. Its advan-
tages are that none of the IDPSs needs to have complete
information of the entire network topology; it has a more
scalable design since there is no central entity respon-
sible for doing all the correlation work and simplifies the
alarm correlation locally. The main problem is that the in-
formation on all alerts is not available during the decision-
making which reduces detection accuracy.
As scalability (GR2) and adaptability (GR5) are the two most
important requirements of a collaborative SIDPS within an
SG, a fully distributed approach is deemed the best choice for
the system’s structure. The proposed solution to this issue
regarding the availability of alarm information and detection
accuracy is discussed in the next section, System’s Func-
tions. The monitored environment of an IDPS is typically
specified as:
• Network-based (NIDPS): Monitors network traffic for
particular network segments or devices and analyzes the
network and protocol behavior to identify suspicious
activities.
• Host-based (HIDPS): Monitors all or parts of the dynamic be-
havior and the state of a computer system. Unlike NIDPS
that dynamically inspects network packets, HIDPS detects
which programs access what resources. HIDPS has the ad-
vantage of being easy to deploy without affecting existing
infrastructures, compared to NIDPS that detects attacks at
the transport protocol layer with quick responses.
In the future, SGs with massive data traffic flows are ex-
pected from multiple sources; CSIDPS should provide a single
unified view.A combination of both the HIDPS and NIDPS solves
the problem of assimilation and scalability through collabora-
tive management, even if such a heterogeneous system is
virtualized in a cloud computing environment with big data
facilities. Fig. 1 depicts the structure of a cooperative distrib-
uted SIDPS in different SG networks with combined HIDPS and
NIDPS, which results in a homogeneous CSIPDS at every level
of the system’s architecture.
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4.2. System’s functions
Due to the complexity of the required SIDPS, we propose a
system combining the use of four advanced techniques: Au-
tonomic Computing, Risk Management, Fuzzy Logic, and Ontology,
which can enhance efficiency into the desired CSIDPS. Auto-
nomic Computing is a recently applied concept which creates
self-managing computing systems by its four properties of self-
configuration, self-optimization, self-healing, and self-protection
(Patel et al., 2009). The fundamentals are based on the coop-
erative SIDPS framework defined by Patel et al. (Patel et al., 2013).
It incorporates three defined concepts of detection manage-
ment in their architecture: fuzzy reinforcement learning
management, knowledge management, and multi-agent au-
tonomic management within the trust manager facility. The
proposed system’s designmeets the requirements of the CIDPS,
and the correlated information flows are developed accord-
ing to the desired characteristics and the complete functional
components of CIDPS as shown in Fig. 2.
The upper part of the figure shows the traditional compo-
nents of a typical IDPS that monitor and collect the audit data
from the sensors, analyze the data and detect intrusions, gen-
erate alarms, and herald the proper response through the
actuators.The advanced components shown in the lower part
of the figure are drawn from the four proposed techniquesmen-
tioned above and their operation described hereafter.
The autonomic manager includes four types of agents.The
checker monitors the related resources through consulting sub-
ontology and detects abnormal behaviors. In the case of
detecting any non-expected change, the ontology is updated
with the new information.The checker sends the status to an
analyzer agent. Once the analyzer receives the information, it
models the complex behavior to understand the current sys-
tem’s state and predicts future anomalies, and by using the
estimated risk tool, it looks for the best action to be taken by
consulting the OKB prior to executing the final action. It also
updates the OKB for subsequent use. The planner structures
actions needed to achieve the goals and to produce a series
of changes to be effected on the protected element.The executer
receives instructions and executes the healing actions like up-
dating the policies. These agents provide the four properties of
autonomic computing: self-configuration since they provide the
rules for the colonies to be followed at runtime; self-healing
while they operate in a cycle from detecting an abnormal be-
havior to solving the problem; self-optimization as the queries
presented by the planner allow the optimization without
Fig. 1 – A combination of NIDPS and HIDPS in a fully distributed heterogeneous framework structure within SG networks
with CSIDPS (Patel et al., 2013).
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compromising the other resources; and self-protection as they
detect non-conforming functionality and update policies and
OKB to avoid recurrence of defects.
Once a threat is determined, the vulnerability scanner in-
spects the impacted systems by penetrating deeper into the
detected vulnerability.The data of vulnerability assessment can
then be analyzed in correlation with network behavioral data.
It makes a real-time assessment of which attacks are occur-
ring and help to evaluate their possible impact on the target
system.
The risk analysis and risk assessment processes become
more comprehensive based on the results obtained from the
fuzzy logic rick calculator. It provides a more efficient risk analy-
sis and ensures that complex variables are all considered when
analyzing the risk and taking the final decisions.
A follow-up from the risk assessment, the domain ontol-
ogy including high and low level concepts (such as attacks,
vulnerabilities and incidents with their fine-grain details) is
gathered and ratified, and a criticality rating is assigned to the
assets by the re-use of the risk calculator. Thereafter, the in-
trusion prevention solutions initiate proactive actions
dynamically to avoid incursions of intrusions to ensure correct
system’s operation and reduce overall operational over-
heads. For example, intrusion prevention rules which are not
applicable to certain systems and applications in a specific IP
address range can be disabled; this reduces false positives sig-
nificantly. These rules may be re-enabled if new data certify
that a particular system has become vulnerable to a known
attack.This real-time protection and prevention reactivates the
system to a state of continuous monitoring, assessment and
Fig. 2 – The functional components of CSIDPS in addition to traditional IDPS for SGs.
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optimizing.To properly analyze the false alarm reduction strat-
egy, it is necessary to quantify the actual risk exposed by the
attacked assets and any other residual risk.
Ontology characterizes knowledge as a set of concepts and
their relation to a domain. Risk management is defined as the
process of identification, analysis, prioritization, and mitiga-
tion of risks. Fuzzy logic permits gradual assessment of a subset
of values in a set of the lower and upper bound threshold
values.
Developing ontology is no mean task. In general, ontology
is an explicit specification of a conceptualization of real world
instances that defines and associates names of entities (like
classes, relations, functions or other objects) with human-
readable text describing what the names mean and formal
axioms that constrain the interpretation and the correct use
of these terms. Hence, ontology defines a formal common vo-
cabulary to establish, share and use information in an
application domain such as CSIDPS. Ontology offers the fol-
lowing advantages which is critical for CSIDPS:
• Sharing: it allows a common understanding about a knowl-
edge domain.
• Reuse: the use of explicit and formal definitions simplifies
knowledge maintenance, allowing users’ agreement about
a given domain model facilitating ontology reutilization.
• Information Structuring: it allows for the capture of data re-
lations semantically and automatic processing to ensure
knowledge legibility and interpretation by humans.
• Interoperability: it allows information sharing among differ-
ent computational systems operating in the same domain
or related domains.
• Reliability: an ontology-based information representation and
automated processing using advanced techniques such
as machine learning which make consistent and more
trustworthy implementation possible at minimum effort and
cost.
• Distinction: to separate domain knowledge from the opera-
tional knowledge, thereby also reducing misinterpretation,
maintainability and cost.
In our proposed system, we created a KB based on the au-
tonomic representation of self-management, consisting of the
four basic building-block characteristics: self-configuration, self-
optimization, self-healing and self-protection pertaining to the
application domain of IDPS.This KB was complemented by the
ontology component initially initiated and instantiated from
our own knowledge and that of professional experts from aca-
demia and industry as well as KDD 991 through direct input
into an expert system, and further complemented by using
OntoIDPSMA.owl (Isaza et al., 2009). Thus, the defined ontol-
ogy implements the intrusions and prevention knowledge by
constructingmultiple classes and their interrelationships which
resulted in over 3600 attacks and intrusions between the main
class and sub-classes. In embodiment, we developed the on-
tology characterized by network components, intrusion
elements and classification defining network traffic signa-
tures and reaction of actual identification and preventative rules,
classes, assertions, axioms and instances using the Ontology
Web Language with Description Logic (OWL-DL) that continu-
ously updates the knowledge base on new encounters and event
correlations schemas. The ontology based on OWL-DL is de-
signed using Protégé (Noy and McGuinnes, 2001; Protégé, 2015)
and integrated into our collaborative system. It is a signature-
based system that detects threats, offers preventative measures
and evolves by building a semantically rich OKB to primarily
detect and secondarily prevent cyber threats and vulnerabili-
ties. The updated mechanisms operate through a complex
reasoning component which keeps the OKB current with in-
formation on new attacks as and when they happen during
the traffic flow. This feature enables the system to suggest
proper actions against possible attacks.
The complex behavior is modeled in order to learn the sys-
tem’s state, predict future irregularities, and apply a risk tool
after the analyzer receives the information. The most appro-
priate course of action is offered after the information is
compared to the OKB. Only then, action would be taken.
The OKB is also updated to prepare and prevent the irregu-
larities going forward.The actions that need to be taken to attain
the identified goal must be considered by the planner to develop
a series of modifications to be effected on the threatened com-
ponent. In this context, the executer accepts instructions and
completes the activities to solve the threat.These agents offer
the four aspects of autonomic computing: self-configuration by
providing rules to be followed at runtime; self-healing by de-
tecting an abnormal behavior through solution of the problem;
self-optimization through the queries outlined by the planner that
enable optimization without the use of additional resources;
and self-protection by detecting poor operation and updating the
guidelines and OKB to prevent the same or similar problems
in the future.
The vulnerability scanner inspects the system after iden-
tifying a threat.The scanner probes into the exposure in more
depth by analyzing and considering the behavioral data tracked
by the network. A more accurate assessment of the impact on
the system enables depiction of what attacks take place in real-
time. Domain ontology must include concepts from a higher
level, such as attacks, vulnerabilities, and incidents. Further,
it is imperative that the risk calculator consigns a criticality rating.
Only thereafter are invasion avoidance solutions formulated
and proactive activities undertaken to avoid attacks, ensure ac-
curate operation and reduce overheads. In this way, false
positives can be significantly reduced, for example, by elimi-
nating unnecessary intrusion prevention rules. The disabled
rules can easily be re-enabled if and when necessary.This con-
tinual monitoring, assessing, and optimizing through real-
time protection prevents threats. In order to analyze the false
alarm reduction strategy, the actual risk will need to be quan-
tified considering the attacked assets and any other residual
risk.
Risks and intrusions have different consequences that must
be considered. Although the system should prevent and detect
all types of intrusions and attacks, it is necessary to identify
the danger level and intensity of the risk. In the case of facing
an asynchronous attack (like a DoS/DDoS attack which floods
the system) and the lack of enough system resources to prevent
1 DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) intrusion
detection evaluation program which is publicly accessible via MIT
Lincoln Lab through (KDD, 1999, KDDCUP, 2007, DARPA Archives,
2007).
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Please cite this article in press as: Ahmed Patel, et al., A nifty collaborative intrusion detection and prevention architecture for Smart Grid ecosystems, Computers & Security
(2016), doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2016.07.002
8 c om pu t e r s & s e cu r i t y ■■ ( 2 0 1 6 ) ■■ –■■
hazards and penetrations, the CSIDPS can prioritize fuzzy re-
sponses based on the dangerous level causing the least
vulnerabilities and possible side-channel intrusion infection.
Fuzzy logic can also help to score vulnerable assets, deter-
mine likelihood levels for threats, evaluate the associated
relative risk, prioritize the alarms, and plan a proper strategy
for response by the risk manager. Membership function opti-
mizer adjusts the membership value of fuzzy sets called fuzzy
violation through each cycle of learning to provide a more ac-
curate answer for the inference engine. The attack information
and reasoned actions provided as responses are updated in the
OKB to ensure improved detection rate of future attacks/
intrusions and reduced false positive alarms.
The proposed system efficiently meets all the require-
ments of an IDPS for an SG in the form of CSIDPS. In the case
of any corruption, the self-healing function is activated to assist
the system in fixing itself by identifying the errors, diagnos-
ing the problem and processing reruns without human
intervention. A self-optimized CSIDPS can optimize its use of
resources while communicating with other systems to trans-
fer the data and files that results in an increase of adaptability
and maintaining the optimum performance when network
traffic changes. This saves the limited computational re-
sources of legacy systems referring to GR1.The CSIDPSs become
more adaptive and real-time by using the same ontologies,
which facilitate communicating and sharing knowledge (GR5)
while accommodating legacy protocols and standards (GR1 and
GR4). The flexible structure of the system meets the required
scalability in GR2.
Using the anomaly detection techniques, appropriate risk
management and severity analysis strengthen detection and
prevention capabilities while minimizing false alarms, as was
pointed out in GR3. During the monitoring of dynamic SG net-
works, the self-configuring characteristic enables the system
to improve the detection of hardware, firmware and software
changes automatically.With the ontology KB (OKB), intrusion
sensors can respond dynamically to threats and other changes,
as well as leverage integral data from several sources on the
network to ensure an updated configuration of the SG.The on-
tology allows defining concepts, objects, and relationships in
a knowledge domain to unify the OKB of the system. It pro-
vides a reasoning framework, intelligence, and inference.They
all provide an ideal situation for a real-time CSIDPS to work
without affecting the system’s performance as referred to in
GR6.
Using the ontologies and agents as mobile helps to syn-
chronize and transfer messages between IDPSs to meet GR7.
Mobile agents are assumed to have incomplete information
since they operate in a complex and dynamic environment of
SG without a global control to synchronize the data.Thus, com-
munication plays a significant role for agents to share the
information, to sync or coordinate their actions, and to manage
their interdependencies.Themajor issue of using mobile agents
is inefficient knowledge sharing between them. Intelligent in-
teroperability between the mobile agents can be achieved using
the ontologies and interpretative knowledge, which initiates
and permits the agents to cooperate while maintaining their
autonomy.
The self-protecting function anticipates detection and pro-
tection of the system itself against threats as it concerns GR8.
A CSIDPS equipped with this property is able to detect secu-
rity incidents as they occur by executing appropriate responses
and corrective actions to lessen their vulnerability. Using au-
tonomous agentsmitigates the risk of compromising the system
since it is difficult for a single attack to affect all the partici-
pants in the system due to the heterogeneous essence of the
agents.
In the current research, several essential techniques in-
cluded in CSIDPS are assessed in the next section. Patel et al.
previously proposed advanced components of this model for
distributed IDPS (Patel et al., 2013). The advanced autonomic
computing components aim to detect the anomaly and
signature-based attacks as well as malicious traffic not iden-
tified by the system.These components, including the Support
Vector Machine (SVM) learning components, network traffic on-
tology, and fuzzy logic, provide a decreased value of false
positive and negative alarms (Patel et al., 2009).
In brief, the scalable fully distributed structure of this system
is scalable and reveals a low accurate detection risk and trouble
in synchronizing information among autonomous agents. Here,
the efficiency of the proposed SIDPS functionality is evalu-
ated concerning detection accuracy, interoperability, and false
positive alarms via simulation and empirical tests.
5. Experimental simulation results
The experiment is designed to employ NIDPS/SIDPS utilizing
Internet network traffic data, for example, Trace of Malicious Data,
Command/Response, Packet Type, Protocol Type, Time to Live, and
Source Destination to authenticate the structure and architec-
ture of CSIPDS. After review, it was felt that this information
was insufficient for a smart IDPS and, thus, for our system.Two
new structures, fuzzy violation and target, were identified as ap-
propriate to analyze the SG traffic more efficiently by advanced
components. Both fuzzy violation and target play critical parts
in the below SIDPS.
Anomaly detection is used to train the SIDPS by learning
normal and abnormal packet commands and traffic patterns
using machine-learning techniques with a general split of the
data into 70% for training and 30% for testing based on the
Support Vector Machine (SVM) with Gaussian Kernel.
SVM is generally used for classification purposes where its
primary goal is to find an optimal decision boundary between
outputs considering the position of the point that signifies a
sequence of variables.
This method addresses the binary class problem with linear
separable input space. For non-linear separable input space,
we converted the space of variables to another linear space.
This approach enables better use and decision-making.
The primary goal is to find the ideal line of decision that
has a maximum margin to guarantee solving the over-fitting
problem. This can be obtained by specifying the center between
the nearest two points from two different classes.The pseudo
code of SVM is shown in the following box:
Pseudo code of SVM
Step 1: Use all the training samples to train an initial SVM,
resulting in l1 support vectors {SVIn i, i = 1, 2,. . ., l1} and the
corresponding decision function d1(x.)
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Step 2: Exclude from the training set the support vectors, whose
projections on the hypersurface have the largest curvatures:
2.1: For each support vector SVIn i, find its projection on the
hyper surface, p (SVIn i), along the gradient of decision
function d1(x).
2.2: For each support vector SVIn i, calculate the generalized
curvature of p (SVIn i) on the Hyper surface, c (Sin i).
2.3: Sort SVIn i in the decreasing order of c (SVIn i ), and
exclude the top n percentage of support vectors from the
training set.
Step 3: Use the remaining samples to re-train the SVM, result-
ing in l2 support vectors {SVRe i, i = 1, 2,. . .,l2} and the
corresponding decision function d2(x). Notably, l2 is usually less
than l1.
Step 4: Use the l2 pairs of data points {SVRe i, d2 (SV Re i)} to
finally train the SVRM, resulting in l3 support vectors {SVFl i, i = 1,
2,. . ., l3} and the corresponding decision function d3(x).Notably,
l3 is usually less than l2.
The initial value of weights of SVM generated lies between
0.0 and 0.005, but the max values allowed in randomization
is 1. In general, the following code in the box was used to gen-
erate the initial values of SVM:
Public Sub initW(m, n)
For i = 1 To n
For j = 1 To m
W(i, j) = Format(Rnd (),#,#)
Next
Next
End Sub
// where:
// m is the number of records and n is the number of features,
// Rnd () is the random number generator function in the range
(0, 1) but in this work, we use the function called Format that
generated a number which consists of three numbers to more
accurately represent the values for SVM.
The maximum value of the Gaussian kernel computed with
a support vector decays equally in all directions, making it an
exponentially decaying function in the input feature space. By
applying an SVM classifier to the Gaussian kernel, a weighted
linear combination of the kernel function computed between
a data point and the support vectors is attained by using equa-
tion (1). The part of a support vector in the classification of a
data point is moderated by α, the global prediction useful-
ness of the support vector and k x y,( ), the intrinsic influence
of a support vector being predicted at a given data point defined
by:
k x y exp
x y
,( ) = − −∂
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
2
2 2
(1)
The criterion to terminate the process depends on the
proviso of two conditions to test any alteration of the epoch
of the SVM in order to verify if the SVM is learning or not learn-
ing. These conditions are based on the following:
• If the total error value of the network becomes less than
the expected error of it (Emax).
• The current epoch value is bigger than the maximum
number of learning epochs (Epochmax). Else, the SVM
updates the weights of the network.
• After verifying one of the stopping criteria to the SVM al-
gorithm, such as the verified cost function condition or
exceeding the number of epochs to the maximum number
of learning epochs without reaching a network error to a
value which is less than the required value,we can say that
the SVM is completed. If the cost function condition is veri-
fied, thismeans that the network can train itself on the input
pattern (i.e., thenetwork is successful in the training process).
• While, if the second condition is verified (i.e., the network
does not reach to an acceptable error and exceeds the
number of epochs), this means that the network fails in the
training process and recognition of the input pattern.
The system was initially intensively trained for 30 hours in
a SCADA network in two classified modes:
1. Supervised Safe Mode enabled the system to learn normal
packet commands and traffic patterns. The fuzzy violation,
which defined danger levels, was set to the safe mode, start-
ing at the minimum level of 0.
2. Supervised Attack Mode enabled a series of defined attacks
such as distributed DoS and virus packets to train the system
with abnormal commands and traffic patterns. The fuzzy
violation was set to the maximum attack mode value 1.
The system was trained for all types of attacks which are
common in all types of network traffic (Cheng et al., 2012) that
are equally applicable to SG networks, such as:
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack tries to use the whole band-
width of the network to overflow the stack of a server or
respondingmachine, thus causing the system to break down
and shut off.
• Packet Splitting is IP fragmentation and TCP segmentation
of data packets to neglect the actual attacks by hiding the
packets into various segmentations. An ID usually ignores
detection of intrusions while they do not reassemble the
packets to be recognized.
• Duplicate Insertion technique replicates the packets and inserts
them into the stream to confuse the IDS.This technique uses
lower TTL values for the inserted values to make sure that
the actual intrusion is received completely. Overlapping IP
packets can be ambiguous to IDS.
• Payload Mutation transforms the intrusion packets into se-
mantically safe packets.This attack makes the packets look
different with the intrusion signatures.
• Shellcode Mutation Attack encodes the shell code into a poly-
morphic form to evade IDS that recognizes a shell code
according to the signatures extracted from one or a few vari-
ants of that specific shellcode.
• Brute Force intrusion uses various authentication informa-
tion and methods to authenticate the system.
• Command Insertion attack inserts the whole intrusion
command into a regular and safe command, and it cannot
be detected while the whole command is right semanti-
cally, but the integrated command can intrude the system.
SQL Injection is an example of this type of attack.
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An advantage of this approach is that the serial random con-
struction of data attacks can be used in simulation experiments
which can be identified through diagnostic Linux command
executions.
There is no way to know if these experimental attacks are
applicable to the real world scenario, as this approach does not
include a definition of a “normal attack.” The result would be
a diagnostic approach that would serve as an alert only. This
alert would be beneficial; however, in that, it would signal
the need for further investigation. New research could address
this in the future as new and improved techniques are
advanced.
The process of model modification is inexpensive com-
pared to the cost of the actual implementation and allows a
greater variety of situations to be examined without making
changes to a real network. In this approach, network simula-
tors model the features of existing networks to determine what
can be altered and what results might come about.
We used the most recent version of the Network Simula-
tor (NS) NS-2.33, which depicts real networks (NS-2, 2015) and
has evolved by comprising a considerable number of tailored
packages supporting many types of network events. We pro-
grammed it using C++ programming and TCL script languages
with object-oriented extensions (called OTcl) developed at MIT
that allow for rapid implementation of the systemmore easily
and represented visually and graphically. The main advan-
tages of using NS-2.33 are the following:
• Cheap – it does not require costly equipment.
• Complex scenarios are easily conceived and tested.
• Results are quickly obtained, evaluated, and more ideas for-
mulated and tested in a smaller period without disturbing
the real operational network depicted by it.
• Supports a variety of data exchange formats and network
communication protocols.
• Supported on various OS platforms and allows writing
program scripts in various object-oriented and other pro-
gramming languages.
• Modularization offers component a replacement strategy
for rapid experimentation of different function or protocols.
• It is popular and known to produce reliable and trustwor-
thy results.
To test the SIDPS and to scale it to reflect real-life SG di-
mensions, the simulation used NS-2 in real-time in excess of
1 Mb/s per network sector, that is, about twice higher than ex-
pected traffic in the real present or future SGs (Bender, 2009).
The SIDPS was incorporated in the simulator and tested by
using the traffic data captured from the SCADA network and
run for another 30 hours for the sake of consistency with the
initial 30 hours. Three different components were developed
to operate as a data collector, trainer, and analyzer in NS-2. By
using SVM, the SIDPS analyzed the traffic of the network and
assigned fuzzy violation values between 0 and 1 for each
command/response, which differentiated the safe/unsafe traffic
patterns. Fig. 3 output from the experiment shows the gener-
ated traffic in the simulated SG network.
Two novel types of attacks of force, command injection and
brute, were used to test the SIDPS and were not trained by the
system in order to test the system’s vulnerabilities for intru-
sion detection and to determine its capacity for intrusion
detection. The network traffic was classified and every packet
ascribed a fuzzy violation value (see Table 2).Attacks were iden-
tified correctly, but in addition, some of the safe commands/
responses received high fuzzy violation values – causing more
severe attacks to trigger false positive alarms. The SIDPS did
detect threats appropriately. However, the amount of false posi-
tive alarms was disproportionately high (see Fig. 4(b)).
The attacked/exposed assets’ risk, as well as the residual
risk of the asset, was quantified to analyze the false alarm re-
duction strategy more appropriately. First, a list of basic SG
assets was determined, and risk values were assigned, con-
sidering their impact on profitability, sensitivity, and outcome
of threats. Fuzzy logic was used to represent the scores, al-
lowing the SIDPS to assess the accuracy of the alarm and to
identify the proper response. In order to accomplish this, five
fuzzy sets are containing valid ranges of the inputs (from criti-
cal to low) as well as residual and exposed risks (illustrated in
Fig. 4(a)). Exact boundaries were not used in fuzzy logic; rather,
sets are identified depending upon the degree of the mem-
bership function values, ranging from 0 to 1.
Another feature was the potential target of each attack
through KB query.The SIDPS linked to CoreSec ontology in order
to construct themost suitable Ontology-based KB (OKB) by using
Protégé software (de Azevedo et al., 2008). In this way, it was
Fig. 3 – Simulated traffic in an SG network in 30 hours from real data.
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possible to identify the potential targets considering abnor-
malities, differences, similarity, fingerprints, signatures, and
activities by examining the risks values as membership func-
tions. In addition, the OKB also enabled collaboration among
diverse independent agents via an organized and unified frame-
work to present the information about the attacks, risks, and
response actions.
The system was able to assess the risks and determine how
best to deal with the malicious attacks because it recognized
the final target of each command and/or response. As an ad-
ditional benefit, this feature decreased the number of false
positive alarms and kept high detection rates.
The number of distributed attacks tracked in a real SG under
study was well over 3600 network in a 30-hour period, of which
a snapshot of 3256 attacks after cleaning of countless types rep-
licated over the network in the same 30-hour period was taken
in order to evaluate the system’s performance in a nearly real-
world scenario. In this scenario, the SIDPS compared the
abnormal commands it received with its KB to detect the
attacks, optimize the two attributes of fuzzy violation, and then
set the target. This self-learning procedure led to the genera-
tion of alerts, prevention plans, and appropriate responses to
attack as well as supplying information to the OKB to con-
tinue to defend and reconstruct against impending assaults.
The attacks are shown in Table 2(a) and it illustrates the
query of the KB for each possible attack as it aided SIDPS in
maintaining and improving the correct configuration to ensure
the system’s stability. Table 2(b) shows the queries of the OKB,
which enabled the system to optimize, protect, configure, and
even heal itself in the face of identified attacks. The healing
actions presented in Table 2(b) recovered from the CoreSec on-
tology by mapping and tracking the origin as well as the target
of each malicious assault.
Theoverall effectivenessof advancedSIDPScomponents could
be assessed by a comparison of detection and false positive
alarms. Additional testing was conducted using the new ele-
ments. In Fig. 4(b), the reader can see the differences of the SIDPS
comparing “with” and “without” advanced components.While
it is apparent that detection accuracy was nearly the same, a
significant reduction of false positive alarmswas achieved, pro-
viding greater efficiency and better performance as shown in
Fig. 4(c).Table 3 illustrates a comparison between traditional and
advanced components for the detection and false positive rates
of CSIDPS, particularly the efficiency rate. This analysis em-
ployed the trapezoidal curve, which represented the fuzzy
membership function. Itwas a functionof a vector x anddepends
on four scalar parameters a, b, c, and d given by:
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Or, more compactly as:
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The upper part locates the parameters a and d of the trap-
ezoid while the parameters b and c locate the lower part.
As shown in Table 4, the simulation process reflecting our
proposed system used the neural network, fuzzy member-
ship function and simulated attacks parameters. The main
function of the neural network component is defined by the
following:
*Efficiency Rate
DetectionAccuracy FalsePositiveAlarms
=
+ −(100 )
2
(3)
These are the optimum rates in the advanced SIDPS, which
can be equally applicable in a traditional SIDPS, depending on
how it is implemented.
Table 2 – Representing three examples of simulated attacks on the system: (a) detected features of three attacks and (b)
healing actions constructed from CoreSec Ontology-based KB (OKB) for three identified attacks
(a)
Trusted source Destination IP Command Protocol Target Fuzzy violation
192.168.1.1 192.168.1.10 HTTP/GET HTTPS Server/DBv 0.63
192.168.1.5 192.168.1.12 SYN UDP Servers 0.84
192.168.1.7 192.168.1.15 HTTP/GET HTTP/IP Servers 0.70
(b)
Attack type Target Fuzzy violation Autonomic actions for self-healing functions
Command injection Server/DB 0.63 – Changing DB user grants
– Blocking the traffic
– Reconfiguring server service pools
– Initializing a trap
DoS (SYN flood) Servers 0.84 – Analyzing UDP/TCP packets
– Blocking the sender IP address
– Data diversion into a trap
Brute force Servers 0.70 – Changing user’s grants
– Blocking the traffic from specific users
– Complementary authentications
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Different accuracies on the attacks were determined by
matching the detection accuracy to false positive alarms as an
efficiency factor via applying the threshold value of attack se-
verity on the fuzzy violation (see Fig. 4(b)). The detection rate
and false positive alarms increased as the threshold value de-
creased. As observed from Fig. 4(c), the fuzzy threshold value
of 0.4 provided the most useful results for false positive alarm
rate of 13.2% and a higher detection rate of 88.9% for CSIDPS.
This research was conducted based on the criteria of detec-
tion accuracy and false positive alarms.There was also another
important criterion in an IDPS, which was the false negative
alarm. False negative alarms were related to the malicious
attacks that were not detected as intrusions and were di-
rectly linked to the complement value of the detection accuracy.
For example, if the detection accuracy was 80%, its comple-
ment value was equal to 20% (100% − 80% = 20%).The resulting
20% denotes the data packets, which were malicious but not
detected, and they were called false negative alarms. False
negative alarms and detection accuracy can be clearly com-
municated through a straightforward formula (False Negative
Alarms = 100 − Detection Accuracy Percentage).
The complement value of detection accuracy provides the
false negative alarm rate as shown in Fig. 4 (Cheng-Yuan et al.,
2012). This experiment was conducted with heavy traffic, with
(a) Membership function represents exposed risk and residual risk
(b) Comparison among the SIDPS with and without advanced components
(c) Comparison between traditional and advanced components of CSIDPS
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Fig. 4 – (a, b, and c) Optimizing detection performance through risk analysis.
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all of the commands/responses being analyzed. In summary,
this experiment proved the rewarding performance of the de-
signed CSIDPS with advanced components in terms of high
detection accuracy, low false positive alarms, deterministic
without affecting network performance and operated in self-
managing autonomic computing mode.
This research evaluated CSIDPS advanced components to-
gether to decrease the false positive and false negative alarms.
The combination of SVM, fuzzy model, the ontology of network
traffic and intrusion, combined with autonomic computing, is
a novel approach that resulted in a new proposed model of an
intelligent and nifty CSIDPS architecture for SG environments.
It was of utmost importance to note that an IDPS is no better
than the data on which it was operating because bad data pro-
duced bad IDPS. For example, in real-life, they might not be
representative of the correctly labeled training data that existed
on a given system.This lack of “good” data would make it dif-
ficult to obtain good results if one does not use multi machine-
learning techniques in a real-world operational environment
of SGs. This, however, will require more intensive and new
advanced research. One can use regression methodologies
because it gives the continuous values rather than those based
on the trapezoidal curve. A mathematical model of the result
based on the linear combination principle can be applied. For
example, a function of a vector x and four scalar parameters
were based on a series of continuous values representing the
real world factors rather than the four individual distinct in-
tegral parameter values a, b, c, and d that can be designed to
produce more optimal results.
This current research simulated and evaluated CSIDPS per-
formance to assess its flexibility and ability to be utilized in
SG networks with different levels of functionality and to explore
the intrusion detection accuracy. The other measure for the
efficiency of the systemwas the false positive alarm rate, which
decreased through the evaluation process. The results of this
study vividly provided higher intrusion detection accuracy and
lower false positive alarm rate of CSIDPS compared to tradi-
tional IDPS.
There were many types of robustness evaluation mea-
sures, such as the accuracy of a classifier was measured as the
percentage of instances that were correctly classified, and the
error was measured as the percentage of incorrectly classi-
fied instances (unseen data).When the considered classes were
imbalanced, or misclassification costs were unequal, the ac-
curacy and the error were not insufficient. Therefore, in this
work we used the technique based on the confusion matrix
called Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC), which was a
useful technique of graphs for organizing classifiers, visual-
izing their performance and assessing their overall behavior.
It was commonly used in making medical decisions (Kumar
and Indrayan, 2011), and was also widely used by the machine
learning and data mining research communities to analyze the
performance of classifiers (Wang et al., 2015). Besides, ROC
graphs were very useful in assessing the overall behavior and
reliability of the classification task under inspection. There-
fore, the ROC technique was cleverly used in this work to
analyze the CSIDPS performance.
The ROC graph shows the relation between theTrue Positive
Fraction (TPF) on the y-axis and the False Positive Fraction (FPF)
on the x-axis as shown in Fig. 5. The TPF is defined as follows:
Table 3 – Detection and false positive rates of CSIDPS with traditional and advanced components
Threshold
value (less
than x)
SIDPS with
advanced
components
detection
accuracy
SIDPS with
advanced
components
false positive
alarms
SIDPS with
advanced
components
efficiency*
SIDPS with
traditional
components
detection
accuracy
SIDPS with
traditional
components
false positive
alarms
SIDPS with
traditional
components
efficiency*
Efficiency
factor,
detection
versus false
positive
0.0 100.00% 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00% 50.00% Absolutely low
0.1 98.01% 69.00% 64.50% 99.00% 95.20% 51.90% Extremely low
0.2 96.05% 43.30% 76.35% 97.50% 91.10% 53.20% Low
0.3 94.09% 20.40% 84.84% 93.00% 82.00% 55.50% Medium
0.4 88.90% 13.20% 87.85%* 85.00% 78.20% 53.40% Efficient result
0.5 81.20% 9.01% 86.09% 83.43% 70.01% 56.71% Efficient result
0.6 67.10% 7.50% 79.90% 75.00% 52.90% 61.05%* Medium
0.7 45.60% 6.30% 69.65% 53.40% 38.30% 57.55% Medium
0.8 32.04% 2.70% 65.67% 38.70% 19.70% 59.50% Low
0.9 21.50% 1.40% 60.05% 25.50% 9.30% 58.10% Very low
1.0 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% No detection, no false
positive alerts
*Efficiency rate is defined as stated in Equation 3 in the text.
Table 4 – Main parameters used in the experimental
simulation process
Tools Parameters Values
Neural network
(SVM)
Initial values of
weights
Random values in the
range interval (0 to 1)
Max number of
iterations
5000
Max value of error 0.009
Fuzzy membership
function
б 0.0001
a 0.02
b 0.5
c 0.8
d 1.2
Simulated attacks Target Server/DB
Servers
Fuzzy violation 0.63
0.84
0.70
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TPF
TP
TP FN
=
+
(4)
where TP is the number of true positive test results, and FN is
the number of false negative test results.
The False Positive Fraction is given by:
FPF
FP
TN FP
=
+
(5)
where FP is the total number of false positive test results, and
TN is the number of true negative test results.
5.1. Why is ROC of benefit here?
The ROC curve is a plot of values of the False Positive Rate (FPR)
versus theTrue Positive Rate (TPR) for all possible cutoff values
from 0 to 1.
The ROC curve analysis used in this work has several ad-
vantages. First, in contrast to single measures of sensitivity and
specificity, the analytical accuracy, such as the Area Under the
Curve (AUC)2 driven from this analysis, is not affected by the
ultimate decision criterion, and it is also independent of the
prevalence of syndrome since it is based purely on sensitiv-
ity and specificity. Second, several analytical tasks on the same
subjects can be compared simultaneously in an ROC space and
the methods substantiate by considering the covariance
between the two correlated ROC curves. Third, one can easily
obtain the sensitivity at specific FPF (as shown in Fig. 5) by vi-
sualizing the curve. Fourth, the optimal cut-off value can be
easily determined using ROC curve analysis, especially the
AUC.
What gives credibility to the use of ROC is that the AUC is
a generic evaluation metric for binary classification prob-
lems. For example, consider a plot of the true positive rate
versus the false positive rate as the threshold value for clas-
sifying an item as 0 or is increased from 0 to 1: if the classifier
is very good, the true positive rate increases quickly and the
AUC is close to 1. If the classifier is no better than random
guesstimating, the true positive rate increases linearly with the
false positive rate and the AUC curve oscillates around 0.5. One
important characteristic of the AUC is that it is independent
of the fraction of the test population which is class 0 or class
1, thus making the AUC so very useful for evaluating the per-
formance of classifiers on unbalanced data sets.
6. Conclusion
Future SG vision demands value transition with a focus on a
more reliable, secure, efficient, and safer electric grid.This vision
involved the latest technologies and techniques to ensure
success, meanwhile maintaining the flexibility to adapt to
further developments.Toward this foresight, a collaborative self-
managed CSIDPS was designed that provided functionality
improvements through self-learning abilities over time, and
could only be tailored to any other SG system and network due
to its flexible and smart design.
In order to support any further evolving and advances of
a future SG, as well as its special requirements, the CSIDPS pro-
posed in this paper utilized three advanced components:
autonomic manager, knowledge manager, and fuzzy logic risk
manager, which were deemed essential for an SG. Based on
this, our proposed simulated system demonstrated a better de-
tection rate with low false positive alarms. This system, with
a combination of advanced cooperative smart soft computing
and autonomic computing components, was a novel2 http://mlwiki.org/index.php/ROC_Analysis.
Fig. 5 – ROC of advanced components of CSIDPS.
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approach in an IDPS setting. This CSIDPS framework over-
came the recent challenges in detecting unknown vulnerabilities
with lower false positive and false negative alarms, which
resulted in higher detection accuracy than the traditional IDPSs.
An interesting addition to CSIDPS would be to include a com-
prehensive digital forensics component as a stratagem, since SG
is a critical infrastructure which must be fully protected and
cyber culprits prosecuted with sound evidence.
A complete experimental construction of a CSIDPS includ-
ing a combination of several autonomous agents in wired and
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is being embedded in SG ap-
plications such as in attacker tracking and harmful disruption
monitoring with autonomic detection and prevention using NS-3
and CloudSim simulators, followed by rapid prototyping to further
assess CSIDPS’s long-term worth. In particular, soft comput-
ing predictive and non-predictive techniques will also be examined
to assess the influence on the exact nature of a preemptive
CIDPS.
Soft computing and machine learning techniques can be
enormously beneficial for IDPS. Rather, machine learning com-
bined with other soft computing and computational intelligence
techniques and tools for constructing a versatile CSIDPS func-
tioning as a total autonomic computing system has many
advantages over traditional IDPSs. Taking it a step further,
a multi-machine language approach complemented by regres-
sion techniques and game theory would have a huge potential
to build a fully-fledged intelligent CSIDPS that is credible, ef-
fective, efficient and smart (Shamshirband et al., 2014). It can
also be linked to fault diagnosis of SGs (Rawat et al., 2016).
It is believed that the useful capabilities of the CSIDPS ar-
chitectural system could be a potential candidate that could
contribute in the work of de facto norms in both SG and IDPS
subject areas.
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